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Convenience Theory of Cryptocurrency Crime: A Content Analysis of U.S. 
Federal court Decisions 
This article examines cryptocurrency cases decided in the U.S. District and Circuit Courts 
to determine the applicability of Gottschalk’s convenience theory of white collar crime to 
cryptocurrency crime litigation and to empirically analyze whether the conditions under 
which cryptocurrency offenses occurred show support for the convenience theory.  
Analysis of U.S. federal district and circuit court case law involving cryptocurrency crimes 
and fraud indicate support for the convenience theory of white-collar crime. Defendants in 
various schemes were motivated by financial gain, either for the company or for personal 
use. Their roles and positions in the businesses allowed them access to resources that 
helped them perpetrate fraud through the following mechanisms: (1) operation of front 
companies; (2) relationship building by defendants; (3) over representing profits that 
investors would obtain from purchases of virtual currencies, representing that tokens were 
safe and reliable investments when they were risky, and overestimating abilities and 
capacities to provide services promised to investors in securities fraud; (4) breaching 
fiduciary duties to their clients and corporate stockholders by misappropriating profits for 
their own personal gain; and, (5) engaging in dark web transactions that guaranteed 
anonymity. Defendants also employed various neutralization techniques to justify their 
crimes.   
Keywords: cryptocurrency; virtual currency; convenience theory; white collar crime; 
financial fraud; corporate crime 
Introduction 
Virtual currencies or cryptocurrencies are: (1) digital assets used as a medium of 
exchange (Young, Donley, and Kneller 2016); (2) stored electronically in “digital wallets” and 
transacted on the internet through a direct peer-to-peer system; and (3) called “cryptocurrencies” 
because they use “cryptographic protocols to secure transactions” recorded on publicly available 




allows the public to verify and acknowledge transfers of virtual currency from one user to 
another “without requiring any central intermediary” (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
2017). Advocates of distributed ledgers, the blockchain technology underlying virtual currencies, 
claim that these will “enhance economic efficiency, mitigate centralized systemic risk, defend 
against fraudulent activity and improve data quality and governance” (Giancarlo 2016, 2018). 
Virtual currencies, however, are not backed by any government, fiat currency, or commodity 
(Anello and Lee 2017) and at least one federal district court has ruled that bitcoin is not “money” 
although it operates as a medium of exchange because, unlike cash or currency, it “does not issue 
from or enjoy the protection of any sovereign” (U.S v. Petix 2016:*5).  
   The price of bitcoin and other virtual currencies remains volatile, rising and falling at 
extreme rates (Kharif 2017). On Feb. 6, 2018, coinmarketcap.com reported that there were more 
than 1,500 virtual currencies with bitcoin having the largest market capitalization of 
$121,264,863,386— one unit of bitcoin was valued at $7,196.92, while Strong Hands, the 
cheapest virtual currency was valued at $0.000001 (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a). The “combined 
market capitalization” of all virtual currencies dropped from $795 billion on January 6, 2018 to 
$329 billion on Feb. 6, 2018 (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a:219; Kharpal 2018). Due to their 
extreme variability in value, online exchanges such as Coinbase were created to allow the public 
to trade and invest in virtual currencies (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a; Popper 2017). 
The increase in online virtual currency transactions has resulted in a concomitant increase 
in fraudulent and criminal activity (Sanchez 2017). Silk Road, an online market for illicit activity 
and drugs, allowed transactions only in bitcoin. Since its closure following undercover 
operations by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other online black markets have 




also susceptible to hacking and theft (Hern 2014). Hackers, for instance, have stolen 
approximately $532.6 million from the Tokyo-based cryptocurrency exchange Coincheck Inc., 
raising questions about security and regulatory protection (Wilson, Sano, and Zaharia 2018). 
These criminal activities have led to calls for increased governmental oversight and regulation of 
virtual currency (Braaten 2019). 
Legal context of cryptocurrency regulation 
Cryptocurrency as funds  
Table 1 provides a summary of the statutes governing cryptocurrency litigation. Section 
1960 makes it a crime to knowingly operate an “unlicensed money transmitting business” (U.S. 
v. Budovsky 2015:*6) and provides a penalty of a fine and not more than five years imprisonment 
(18 U.S.C. § 1960(a)). Section 5330, a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act, requires the 
registration of money transmitting businesses with the Secretary of Treasury while 31 C.F.R. § 
1022.380(a)(1) requires its registration with the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”). FinCEN also issued clarificatory guidelines, stating 
that virtual currency exchangers are considered money transmitters (the “2013 FinCEN 
Guidance”) and that existing Bank Secrecy Act regulations apply to persons creating or 
transmitting virtual currencies (U.S. v. Budovsky 2015; U.S v. Lott 2014; U.S. Dep’t of Treasury 
FinCEN 2013). The law and regulations require businesses to register as a money transmitter 
within 180 days from the date of its organization or incorporation. Cryptocurrencies such as 
bitcoin are subject to money transmitting and money laundering laws because they can be 
purchased in exchange for currency, act as a denominator of value, and are used in financial 




1997; SEC v. Shavers 2013; U.S v. Faiella 2014; Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enterprises, Inc. 1997; 
Yates v. U.S 2015).  
Cryptocurrencies as commodities  
The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) defines “commodities” as including “all other 
goods and articles” and “all services, rights, and interests” in which contracts “for future delivery 
are presently or in the future dealt in” (Title 7 U.S.C. §1(a)(9)). A “commodity” is “an article of 
trade or commerce” (Garner 2014), “an economic good” (Merriam Webster 2019), “goods sold 
in the market with a quality and value uniform throughout the world” (Prentis 2015:626), a 
“store of value” that accommodates man’s physical wants and needs (Litwack 2015:343), and a 
“type of monetary exchange” (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a:225; Prentis 2015:628-629). In an 
administrative proceeding in 2015, the CFTC issued an order in which it found that virtual 
currencies can be classified as commodities (In the Matter of: Coinflip, Inc. 2015).  
   Table 1 summarizes the commodity anti-fraud provisions of Title 7 U.S.C. §9(1) of the 
CEA and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1. To prove a violation of the commodity fraud provisions of the CEA, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) must show that: (1) defendants engaged 
in prohibited conduct (e.g., employed a fraudulent scheme; made a material misrepresentation, 
misleading statement or deceptive omission; or engaged in a business practice that operated as a 
fraud); (2) with scienter or intent; and (3) in connection with a contract of sale of a commodity in 
interstate commerce (CFTC v. Commodity Inv. Grp., Inc. 2006; CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 
Inc. 2002). The CFTC has jurisdiction “if there is fraud or manipulation involving a virtual 
currency traded in interstate commerce” (CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities 2014:1348; CFTC 
v. S. Tr. Metals, 2018:1319). 




supervision over virtual currencies (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a; Giancarlo 2018). The CFTC has 
anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority over “any contract of sale of any commodity in 
interstate commerce” (CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. 2018:495). The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), Department of Justice, Treasury 
Department, and state agencies have also exercised their concurrent regulatory authority over 
virtual currencies (Gorman 2018). The U.S. approach to oversight of virtual currency is 
“multifaceted” and “multi-regulatory” (Giancarlo 2018:10), consisting of the following: (1) 
criminal law prosecutions of Ponzi-like schemes by the Department of Justice, or state criminal 
agencies, or civil litigation based on allegations of fraud (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a; U.S v. 
Faiella 2014; U.S v. Lord 2017); (2) regulation as commodities by the CFTC (Giancarlo 2018); 
(3) regulation as securities by the SEC (SEC v. Plexcorps 2017); (4) regulation for violation of 
U.S. anti-money laundering laws by the FinCEN (Hudak 2017); (5) regulation as property by the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) (IRS Notice 2014-21; U.S v. Coinbase, Inc. 2017); (6) self-




Insert Table 1 here 
_____________________________ 
Cryptocurrencies as securities  
Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act grants a private right of action against any person 
who offers or sells an unregistered security in violation of Section 5 (Scheck Invs., L.P. v. 
Kensington Mgmt., Inc. 2009, SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc. 1999). Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 prohibit “fraudulent conduct 




(SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc. 2001:855). The term “security” under the Securities Act and the 
Howey Test includes an “investment contract” which involves: “(1) an investment of money, (2) 
in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others 
(Gugick v. Melville Capital, LLC 2014:*4; S.E.C. v. Edwards, 2004:395, quoting United Hous. 
Found., Inc. v. Forman 1975:852; S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co. 1946:299-299; Tippens v. Round 
Island Plantation LLC 2009:*9, quoting SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc. 1999:1199). 
Transactions involving virtual currency are investment contracts or securities subject to federal 
securities laws, including the registration requirements and anti-fraud provisions of the SEC 
(Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC 2019; Hodges v. Harrison 2019; SEC v. Blockvest, LLC 2018).  
Convenience theory of white collar crime 
White-collar crime typically involves offenders with special access to resources and 
opportunities due to their corporate roles, professional positions, power, influence, and trust by 
others (Felson and Boba 2017; Nolasco, Vaughn, and del Carmen 2013). Nolasco et al. 
(2013:387), for instance, explained that perpetrators of pyramid and Ponzi schemes were able to 
defraud investors through “deliberate misinformation and false promises” and that “defrauded 
investors also placed a significant amount of trust and reliance” on the offenders due to various 
“trust and affinity relationships based on socio-economic status, race or ethnicity, religion or 
special circumstances (i.e., disability or seniority).” Offenders in white collar crime abuse their 
organizational positions or professional status to gain information and access to victims (Felson 
and Boba 2017).  
Marketing theory explains that convenience is the perceived savings in time and effort 
expended to accomplish a task, solve a problem, or exploit favorable circumstances (Farquhar 




an activity” (Gottschalk 2017a:605) when accomplishing an illegal transaction process or 
processes (Collier and Kimes 2012). Convenience orientation refers to the individuals’ and 
organizations’ preference for convenient actions and strategies, including illegal actions, which 
save them time and effort when accomplishing goals (Farquhar and Rowley 2009; Gottschalk 
2018c; Mai and Olsen 2016). Convenience orientation for illegal actions “increases when 
negative attitudes toward legal actions increase” (Gottschalk 2018a:1602). Motivated by greed or 
facing strain, white collar offenders perceive an illegal action as a viable and convenient solution 
to a difficult problem despite potential costs consisting of the likelihood of detection and future 
punishment. Financial crime saves them time and effort when solving a problem to obtain 
personal or organizational profit. Gottschalk (2017a:605) describes this as “[p]aying for 
convenience”—“reducing time and effort now entails a greater potential for future cost.”  
Convenience theory explains that convenience in three dimensions facilitate white-collar 
crime: (1) the economic dimension or financial desire attracts offenders to crime as a convenient 
way of satisfying desires for personal and organizational profits, including achieving the 
American dream (Trahan, Marquart, and Mullings 2005); (2) the organizational dimension or 
organizational opportunity enables offenders with key corporate roles to gain convenient access 
to corporate resources and personnel; and, (3) the behavioral dimension enables offenders to 
conveniently justify and rationalize their deviant behaviors (Gottschalk 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 
2019; Kaptein and Van Helvoort 2019).  
Gottschalk’s (2017a) convenience theory posits the following: (1) financial crime can 
occur within an organization without being detected; (2) offenders are motivated by profits and 
success resulting from negative (threats) and positive (strengths) circumstances;  offenders are 




or to pay off personal debts (Brightman 2009). Offenders are motivated from strengths when 
expanding into profitable foreign markets or satisfying their greed (Bucy et al. 2008; Goldstraw-
White 2012; Hamilton and Mickethwait 2006); (3) the offender’s profession and organizational 
role grants him or her access to resources (Benson and Simpson 2015; Pickett and Pickett 2002) 
and enables him or her to commit white-collar crime without substantial risk of detection and 
punishment (Aguilera and Vadera 2008; Haines 2014), especially when the prevailing 
organizational structure and culture is conducive to unethical or illegal behavior (Dion 2008; 
Pontell, Black, and Geis 2014; Puranam, Alexy, and Reitzig 2014); (4) the organizational 
environment enables the offender to commit financial crime “without being perceived as a 
deviant person or suspicious person” because of his or her social capital (Gottschalk 2017a:613); 
and (5) acceptance and neutralization of deviant behavior facilitates criminal behavior (Bystrova 
and Gottschalk 2015) by eliminating feelings of guilt when committing criminal acts (Sutherland 
1940; Sykes and Matza 1957). 
Dimensions of convenience theory 
Economic dimension of crime. White-collar crime is a profit-driven crime, which results 
from “favorable circumstances” characterized by threats and strengths (Gottschalk, 2017a:606). 
Threats arise due to various types of strain (Langton and Piquero 2007), including sunk costs 
arising from capital expenses already invested in the enterprise, possibility of loss, bankruptcy, 
and unique market structures peculiar to the industry, such as monopolies (Chang, Lu, and Chen 
2005; Piquero 2012). Potential competitors in monopolized industries, for example, are pressured 
to either join the monopoly or commit white-collar crime to protect their economic interests 
(Blickle et al. 2006). Strengths arise due to favorable circumstances, including : (1) the 




officials; (2) the likelihood of being promoted, receiving increased compensation, and earning 
bonuses due to goal achievement; and (3) the possibility of enhancing corporate goodwill or 
individual reputation resulting from accumulation of profits (Gottschalk 2017b). Motivated by 
financial gain and greed, offenders resort to white-collar crime to ensure economic survival.  
The economic dimension assumes a rational choice in which offenders weigh their 
economic interests against the probability of detection (Welsh et al. 2014) and desist from 
committing crime where punishment is more certain or severe (Pratt and Cullen 2005). An 
offender will commit white-collar crime if the illegal action is the most convenient and expedient 
option (Agnew 2014) that would allow him or her to achieve gains with the least amount of time 
and energy; offenders are more likely to commit white-collar crime because of his or her 
perception of the low possibility of punishment and detection by the authorities (Gottschalk 
2017b).  
Organizational dimension. The organizational dimension of convenience theory explains 
that white-collar criminals have the opportunity to commit illegal acts by virtue of their corporate 
positions and professional roles in society. Corporate officers (e.g., CEOs, CFOs, chairpersons, 
and executives) and business professionals (e.g., lawyers and accountants) abuse their positions 
and influence to access resources and commit white-collar crime for corporate or personal gain 
(Reed and Yeager 1996). Criminal opportunity is “the presence of a favorable combination of 
circumstances that renders a possible course of action relevant” (Aguilera and Vadera 2008:434). 
Opportunity arises when offenders perceive that they can engage in fraudulent or illegal behavior 
without surveillance, accountability, detection, or punishment (Benson and Simpson 2015; 
Fligstein and Roehrkasse 2016; Haines 2014). An organizational culture, for instance, where 




in white-collar crime (Ashforth et al. 2008; Punch 2003). Opportunity also depends on the 
offender’s social capital which enables his or her access to resources and fosters trust due to his 
or her position in a social or organizational hierarchy or network (Adler and Kwon 2002; Hansen 
2009; Heath 2008). 
Behavioral dimension. The behavioral dimension examines the causes and justifications 
of white-collar crime, including the situational context within which it occurs (Koppen, Poot, and 
Blokland 2010). White-collar criminal behavior occurs, for example, because: (1) it is 
convenient for the criminal to be deceitful to obtain personal gain at the expense of others 
(Pickett and Pickett 2002); (2) offenders apply techniques of neutralization that enable them to 
believe their actions are not unlawful, including denying responsibility, injury, and victim, 
condemning the condemners, appealing to higher loyalties, normality of action, entitlement, legal 
mistake, acceptability of their own mistakes, and existence of dilemmas where reasonable 
tradeoffs were made before committing the crime (Benson and Simpson 2015; Gottschalk 2017b; 
Siponen and Vance 2010; Sykes and Matza 1957); (3) narcissistic behavior (Arnulf and 
Gottschalk 2013; Ouimet 2009, 2010), including narcissistic organizational identification, 
enables the offender to perceive his or her identity as central to the identity of the organization 
(Galvin, Lange, and Ashforth 2015); and (4) small indiscretions over time which lead to 
incremental progression toward serious white-collar crime because of the presence of financial 
gains and benefits and the concomitant absence of supervision or control in an organizational 
culture permissive of unethical behavior (Welsh et al. 2014). This results in a slippery slope 
“defined as a gradual decline in which no one event makes one aware that he or she is acting 




Gottschalk (2018a) found support for convenience theory in his analysis of data involving 
405 white-collar prisoners in Norway from 2009 to 2015: (1) offenders were motivated by desire 
for corporate profits (17% of sample) or personal gain (83%) (economic dimension); (2) all 
offenders occupied trusted positions in their organizations (organizational dimension); and (3) 
offenders applied neutralization techniques to justify their crimes (behavioral dimension). 
Content analysis of media reports, court documents, and autobiographies showed that white-
collar offenders employed the following neutralization techniques: (1) denied responsibility by 
rejecting accountability for the crime and denied leadership roles; (2) denied injury from the 
crime and refuted occurrence of harm; (3) dismissed the victims by denying that anyone suffered 
harm; (4) condemned the condemners by expressing skepticism of critics; (5) appealed to higher 
loyalties as a reason for their actions; (6) alleged normality of action by arguing that everyone 
does it; (7) claimed entitlement to action because of the situation; (8) argued legal mistake and 
considered infringement irrelevant because of error in the law; (9) felt entitled to make mistakes 
and argued that illegal action was within acceptable mistaken quotas; and (10) presented 
dilemma trade-offs by weighting various concerns that resulted in the illegality.  
Objectives 
 Traditional methods of prosecution and enforcement against cryptocurrency crimes may 
no longer be appropriate because of the complexity of transactions involving cryptocurrency and 
the anonymity of the blockchain network through which these transactions occur. For 
criminologists, the rise in cryptocurrency crime presents a problem that must be examined and 
explained through appropriate theories. This article examines cryptocurrency cases decided in 
the U.S. District Courts and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The article applies Gottschalk’s 




analyze whether the conditions under which cryptocurrency offenses occurred show support for 
the convenience theory.  Through a systematic analyses of the mechanisms by which 
cryptocurrency crimes were perpetrated and examination of the common themes underlying each 
form of virtual currency scheme, the article explores the underlying conditions that allowed 
perpetration of various cryptocurrency offenses. The intent is to provide a better understanding 
of the underlying economic, organizational, and behavioral dimensions that allowed perpetration 
of cryptocurrency law violations.  
Method 
The WESTLAW computerized database contains electronic copies of published and 
unpublished court decisions. A keyword search was used to gather cases on bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency offenses decided by all U.S. federal courts until 20 February 2019. The advanced 
search parameters required that the term “bitcoin” appeared in the “main body” of the case 
(N=62). The authors then read each case individually and determined that not all cases were 
relevant to the article’s focus, either because the case did not involve bitcoin or virtual currency, 
did not contain sufficient facts to enable full analysis, or contained a decision that either affirmed 
or repealed a lower court’s decision, without discussing the facts. Also, some of the cases were 
repeated because of the appeal process through the federal courts. The deletion process yielded a 
total of 31 federal court cases. The authors conducted an inductive doctrinal analysis (Nolasco, 
Vaughn, and del Carmen 2010) to synthesize federal court decisions on bitcoin and virtual 
currency, creating a framework from which to organize the analysis (Nolasco and Vaughn 2010; 





Content Analysis of Federal Court Cases 
Mechanisms for perpetrating cryptocurrency crimes 
  Analysis of federal court cases indicate that offenders in cryptocurrency litigation 
perpetrated the following cryptocurrency schemes: (1) operating unlicensed money transmitting 
business and/or money laundering; (2) engaging in commodities fraud; (3) orchestrating 
securities fraud; (4) creating bitcoin scams, bitcoin exchange fraud, and other criminal activities 
related to bitcoin; and (5) owning, administering, or selling on the dark web.  
Unlicensed money transmitting businesses  
  Table 2 summarizes the dimensions of convenience theory within federal court cases 
involving unlicensed money transmitting business dealing in cryptocurrency. In several cases, 
defendants operated an unlicensed money transmitting business dealing in the virtual currency 
bitcoin in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (U.S. v. Faiella 2014; U.S v. Mansy 2017; U.S v. Petix 
2016; U.S v. Stetkiw 2019). Defendants involved in unlicensed money transmitting businesses 
were motivated by personal or corporate gains (economic dimension). Their positions in the 
organization provided them opportunities to perpetrate their unlicensed money transmitting 
scheme through: (1) creating front companies to conceal the true nature of their unlicensed 
money transmitting business (U.S v. Murgio 2016); (2) accessing resources that enabled them to 
defraud investors and government regulators, including company emails, accounts, websites, and 
other information technology infrastructure; and (3) implementing procedures in online digital 
currency exchanges that guaranteed anonymity among users (U.S. v. Budovsky 2015) 
(organizational dimension). Defendants justified or explained their behavior through various 
neutralization techniques: (1) alleging legality of action, arguing that state laws did not require 




(2) claiming no injury because he or she exchanged cash received from customers for the 
equivalent value in bitcoin (U.S. v. Faiella 2014) (behavioral dimension). 
_____________________________ 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
_____________________________ 
 
Opportunities: operation of front companies and anonymity among users 
  Several cases involved defendants who created front companies to conceal the illegal 
nature of their businesses. In U.S. v. Murgio (2016), defendant Murgio operated Coin.mx as an 
illegal bitcoin exchange and the Collectables Club as a sham front company to help its members 
sell and trade valuable memorabilia on the internet. At that time, conventional banks refused to 
process bitcoin transactions and closed defendants’ bank accounts upon discovering that they 
transacted in bitcoin (U.S. v. Gross 2017:*5). Defendants thus misled banks by making it appear 
that the transactions were for the Collectables Club (and other, non-bitcoin businesses), 
instructing customers to lie to the banks. Similarly, in U.S. v. Budovsky, 2015, after the Costa 
Rican government regulator refused to grant a license to Liberty Reserve, it continued to operate 
in Costa Rica through Budovsky’s shell company, transferring funds into more than two dozen 
shell-company accounts around the world to evade government seizures. 
  One case illustrates how anonymity in an online digital currency exchange facilitated its 
widespread use among criminal offenders. In 2006, defendants Budovsky and Kats incorporated 
Liberty Reserve in Costa Rica to provide online access to the virtual currency LR, “[an] instant, 
real-time currency for international commerce” (U.S. v. Budovsky 2015:*1). From 2006 to 2013, 
Liberty Reserve processed an estimated 55 million financial transactions and laundered more 




Treasury Department as a money transmitting business. It ensured anonymity by not requiring 
users to validate their identity, allowing them to hide their account numbers when transferring 
funds to make them untraceable and requiring them to use LR for all transactions. Criminal users 
of Liberty Reserve operated from countries worldwide, including China, Nigeria, and the United 
States and consisted of computer hackers for hire, drug-dealing websites, and traffickers of 
stolen credit card and personal identity information.  
In 2009, a Costa Rican government regulatory agency refused to grant a money 
transmitting business license to Liberty Reserve because it did not have basic anti-money 
laundering controls. Budovsky and his co-defendants then created a computer portal that allowed 
Costa Rican regulators to access and monitor fabricated information for suspicious activities. On 
November 18, 2011, FinCEN notified financial institutions about the risks associated with 
transacting with Liberty Reserve. Liberty Reserve then falsely informed Costa Rican officials 
that it sold its business and was no longer operating in Costa Rica, although it continued to 
operate through a shell company controlled by Budovsky. Shortly thereafter, the Costa Rican 
government seized—pursuant to a request by U.S. law enforcement—approximately $19.5 
million in Costa Rican bank accounts held by Liberty Reserve. After this seizure, defendants 
moved Liberty Reserve funds into more than two dozen shell-company accounts around the 
world to evade further seizures. Budovsky and his co-defendants were charged with: (1) 
conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1956(h); (2) conspiracy to 
operate an unlicensed money transmission business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (3) 
operation of an unlicensed money transmission business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. On 
June 23, 2015, Budovsky moved to dismiss the charges. The U.S. District Court for the Southern 





Table 3 summarizes the dimensions of convenience theory within federal court cases 
involving cryptocurrencies considered as commodities fraud. Defendants in commodities fraud 
frequently solicit investors to purchase contracts of services involving cryptocurrency, which are 
considered commodities by the CFTC. These defendants are generally motivated by greed and 
profits derived from illegal operations (economic dimension); their positions within these 
companies provide them access to resources needed to defraud investors (organizational 
dimension); and they employ various neutralization techniques, including denial of responsibility 
and arguing their actions are legal (behavioral dimension). One case illustrates how defendants 
neutralize blame by shifting liability to others. In CTFC v. McDonnell (2018b:684), the 
defendant created multiple personas when dealing with clients to create the appearance that his 
company, CabbageTech, was operated by a specialized teams of experts. In reality, he assumed 
multiple employee personas when dealing with customers, including the fake identities of Jason 
Flack, Michelle Robertson, and Michelle Robinson.  
The defendant’s persona “Jason Flack” ignored client requests to withdraw their 
investments by neutralizing blame and shifting liability to his alter-ego Pat, explaining that: (1) 
Pat was “100%” the cause of the issues and not the company which “is really good;” (2) the 
company is “a legitimate outfit” and is “honestly doing everything possible to rectify the whole 
ordeal “in a pretty reasonable time frame with all that needed fixing;” (3) “I’m on your case and 
on your side;” and (4) “Pat did not reveal he was hacked [but] paid the ransom quietly behind my 
ex-Bosses back” (CTFC v. McDonnell 2018b:684). Defendant further neutralized blame by 
pointing out that,  
“[t]here is a wave of ransomware attacks globally if you google and [Pat’s] lack of knowledge got 




been infected with this malware [sic] top U.S. Gov’t. agencies advise paying the ransom fee 
because it’s anonymous encryption that cannot be reversed.” (CTFC v. McDonnell 2018b:685)   
_____________________________ 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
_____________________________ 
Opportunities: fraudulent promises of exorbitant gains and creation of trust relationships with 
clients 
  Defendants in commodities fraud cases used their positions to falsely promise exorbitant 
gains to investors. Defendants in CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. (2018:494) sold more than $6 
million worth of cryptocurrency called My Big Coin (“MBC”) by claiming that it was “backed 
by gold,” could be used “anywhere MasterCard was accepted,” and was “actively traded on 
several currency exchanges.” The CFTC filed suit against defendants, alleging fraud in the sale 
of a commodity in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) (7 U.S.C. § 9[1]) and 
CFTC regulations (17 C.F.R. § 180.1[a]). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Massachusetts denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
   In another case, defendant Patrick McDonnell, owner and operator of CabbageTech Corp, 
sold membership services to provide expert cryptocurrency trading advice to 11 clients who 
transferred assets valued at $290,429.29 (CTFC v. McDonnell 2018a, 2018b). He falsely claimed 
that clients could potentially earn “300% profits on an investment in less than a week” (CFTC v. 
McDonnell 2018a:232). After receiving membership payments, McDonnell shut down his 
websites three months later without providing any of the promised trading advice, deleted social 
media accounts, ceased communicating with customers, and absconded with customers’ funds 
(CTFC v. McDonnell 2018a). On January 18, 2018, the CTC brought enforcement action against 




fraudulent virtual currency scheme” in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) 
(CTFC v. McDonnell 2018b:653). McDonnell filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that CFTC 
lacked jurisdiction and standing. In denying the motion, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York held that the CFTC has broad anti-fraud authority over fraud related to 
virtual currencies transacted in interstate commerce.  
In cases of commodity fraud, defendants made fraudulent statements to gain the trust of 
customers. In CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. (2018), defendants gained the trust of clients by 
falsely assuring them that MBC was backed by gold and had real fluctuating value in an actively 
traded market. Similarly, in CTFC v. McDonnell (2018a, 2018b), Pat McDonnell was charming 
and personable, building personal relationships with clients to perpetuate fraud. Investors were 
misled by McDonnell’s social media and internet presence, which included “misleading 
statements and omissions about his credentials,” such as his “track record and prowess” as a 
professional Wall Street trader (CTFC v. McDonnell 2018b:661). He skillfully built personal 
relationships of trust and rapport with his customers, called them multiple times, and maintained 
constant communication through email, social media, and internet-based chats.  
Securities fraud  
Table 4 summarizes the economic, organizational, and behavior dimension of 
convenience theory as applied to cryptocurrency cases involving securities fraud. Defendants 
fraudulently sold securities or initial cryptocurrency coin offerings (“ICO”) that were not 
registered with the SEC or were not exempt from registration under federal securities laws for 
the following reasons: (1) the prospect of significant financial gains pressured or incentivized 
defendants to commit fraud; (2) circumstances provided defendants with opportunities to commit 




neutralization techniques.  
_____________________________ 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
_____________________________ 
Opportunities: false statements regarding nature and quality of virtual currency, expertise, and 
ability of promoters  
  The prospects of financial gain, investor desire to make huge profits, and defendants’ 
organizational roles allowed defendants to commit fraud through the following strategies:  
  First, defendants overrepresented the amount of profits that investors would obtain from 
their purchase of virtual currencies (Hodges v. Harrison 2019). They falsely claimed that their 
digital tokens would outperform the market. In two related cases, Canadian based-defendants 
PlexCorps, Lacroix, and Paradis-Royer organized an ICO for an alleged 1 billion tokens of 
PlexCoin (SEC v. PlexCorps 2018a, 2018b). They fraudulently misrepresented that investors 
would earn 1,354% profit within 29 days. Defendants proceeded with the ICO even though the 
Quebec Financial Administrative Tribunal issued an ex parte order enjoining them from 
conducting the ICO. On December 1, 2017, SEC filed an action against defendants for securities 
fraud, claiming that they “unlawfully participated in a fraudulent fundraising scheme to obtain 
more than $15 million from tens of thousands of investors who purchased PlexCoins” (SEC v. 
PlexCorps 2018b:*1). Similarly, defendants in Audet v. Fraser (2017:*3) fraudulently 
represented that Paycoin had an estimated value of $80-$100 per coin with a price guarantee that 
it “would not fall below a $20 price floor.”  
  Second, defendants represented that their cryptocurrencies were safe and reliable 
investments. Defendant Blockvest, for example, offered the digital coin BLV in exchange for 




Blockvest falsely claimed that: (1) it was the “First Licensed and Regulated Tokenized Crypto 
Currency Exchange & Index Fund based in the US;” (2) the ICO was registered and approved by 
the SEC, the CFTC, and the National Futures Association; and (3) the Blockchain Exchange 
Commission (“BEC”)—a fictitious regulatory agency with a fake government seal, logo, and 
mission statement—regulated their offering (SEC v. Blockvest, LLC 2018:*2). In another case, 
defendants in In re Tezos Securities Litigation (2018) also represented that the cryptocurrency 
Tezos was “a solution to the shortcomings of predominant digital currencies such as bitcoin and 
Ethereum.”  
  In yet another case, Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC (2019), defendants organized an ICO by 
offering their virtual currency ATB Coins (“ATB ICO”). According to defendants, the ATB 
Blockchain would be “the fastest blockchain-based cryptographic network in the Milky Way 
galaxy,” capable of delivering “blazing fast, secure, and near-zero cost payments to anyone in 
the world” (Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC 2019:*2). Over a three month period, the ICO raised over 
$20 million from thousands of investors. The ATB Blockchain did not have the technological 
feats that defendants advertised and the value of ATB Coins plummeted. Six months after the 
ICO, the value of ATB Coins decreased by more than 85% from its purchase price. Finally, in 
Audet v. Fraser (2017), defendants sold physical virtual currency mining equipments, hardware-
hosted mining, cloud-hosted mining, investment contracts called Hashlets that “paid returns” on 
“virtual currency mining,” their own virtual currency, Paycoin, and “investment contracts called 
HashStakers that held Paycoins and paid holders a fixed return” (Audet v. Fraser 2017:*2). 
These services were fraudulent because defendants did not own the computer hardware and 
computing power it marketed to its customers. They also falsely claimed that banks, investment 





  Third, defendants overestimated their abilities and capacities to provide services 
promised to investors. In Audet v. Fraser (2017), for instance, defendants oversold their 
computing power by triple and quadruple amounts the number of digital products for which they 
had the actual ability to support. The sales also occurred before defendants finished setting up the 
datacenter where support services and infrastructure would be purportedly stored.  
Bitcoin scams, bitcoin exchange fraud, and other criminal activities related to bitcoin 
  Table 5 summarizes the economic, organizational, and behavior dimension of 
convenience theory as applied to bitcoin scams, bitcoin exchange fraud, and other illegal 
activities related to the use of bitcoins (U.S. v. Brown 2017; U.S. v. Gross 2017). The economic 
motivation for defendant Shrem in Winklevoss Capital Fund, LLC v. Shrem (2019) was his desire 
for the Winklevaus brothers to invest in his company BitInstant to raise the public profile of 
bitcoin. Shrem offered to purchase bitcoin “at the best price” for the Winklevaus brothers’ 
Winklevaus Capital Fund, LLC (“WCF”). Shrem, however, misappropriated 5,000 bitcoin worth 
$61,000 from the $750,000 investment of WCF.  
_____________________________ 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
_____________________________ 
 
In Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd. (2016), defendant Mizuho, a Tokyo-based bank, was 
motivated by the desire to continue earning service fees from processing incoming Mt. Gox wire 
deposits. Mt. Gox, a bitcoin exchange based in Tokyo, Japan started experiencing internal 
problems because: (1) defendant Karpeles (President, CEO, and majority shareholder) was 




the Mt. Gox bank account at Mizuho due to concerns about a U.S. investigation into money 
laundering on the Mt. Gox account and potential legal liability or reputational harm to Mizuho. 
When Karpeles refused to close the account, Mizuho stopped processing international wire 
withdrawals for Mt. Gox, meaning that Mt. Gox users who wired fiat currency to Mizuho could 
not withdraw their money. Mizuho, however, did not publicly disclose that it had stopped all 
international wire transfers out of the Mt. Gox account; instead, defendants continued to accept 
deposits, which earned revenue from service fees. The plaintiffs were U.S. residents who had 
wired fiat money to Mizuho for trading in Mt. Gox. After Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy in Japan 
on February 28, 2014, plaintiffs could not withdraw the U.S. currency that they wired to Mizuho. 
Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Mizuho Bank and Karpeles, asserting claims for 
tortious interference with contract, unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, and accounting. 
Plaintiffs sought to recover financial losses arising from collapse and bankruptcy of the 
exchange.  
Opportunity: corporate roles allowing breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation  
  In the above cases, defendants abused their corporate roles by breaching their fiduciary 
duty to their clients and corporate stockholders. Defendant Shrem breached his duty of loyalty to 
WCF by pocketing 5,000 bitcoins instead of turning the same over to his principal client 
(Winklevoss Capital Fund, LLC v. Shrem 2019). Mizuho Bank did not publicly disclose that it 
had stopped all international wire transfers out of the Mt. Gox account but continued accepting 
deposits and earning revenues; as a result, investors who continued to deposit money into 
Mizuho could not withdraw their funds (Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd. 2016). Defendants in Shin 
v. Time Squared Global, LLC (2016) also deceived investors through a bitcoin mining scheme 




and give investors daily revenues from mining and (2) commissions for bringing other investors 
into the scheme. The scheme was fraudulent because the ASIC chips did not exist and investors 
who brought in other investors did not receive the promised commissions.  
  The case of U.S. v. Gross (2017) illustrates how defendants Murgio, Lebedev, and Gross 
abused their corporate positions to defraud corporate stockholders. Murgio and Lebedev operated 
Coin.mx as an illegal bitcoin exchange. They decided to take full control of a federal credit union 
to facilitate their bitcoin transactions. They paid $206,000 in bribes to Gross, Chairman of the 
Board of Directors (“Board”) of Helping Other People Excel Federal Credit Union (“HOPE”) to 
enable them to take over the Board of HOPE and to “evade potential scrutiny” from other 
financial institutions about the nature of their bitcoin business (U.S. v. Gross 2017:*1). After 
taking control of HOPE, defendants allowed KapCharge, a Canadian payment processing 
company, to process Coin.mx’s automated clearing house (“ACH”) transactions at HOPE 
(including its bitcoin transactions). Defendants allowed the processing of ACH transactions that 
were “unsafe” for the credit union because of lack of efforts to comply with various financial 
regulations (e.g., the Bank Secrecy Act and the Office of Foreign Asset Control) and the 
magnitude of these ACH transactions given the level of HOPE’s capitalization, which was 
inconsistent with existing federal regulations (U.S. v. Gross 2017:*10). On March 17, 2017, 
defendant Gross was convicted of two counts: (1) participating in a conspiracy to bribe the 
Chairman of a federal credit union, obstructing an examination of the National Credit Union 
Administration (“NCUA”), and making false statements to the NCUA; and, (2) accepting bribes. 
The dark web 
In several cases, defendants used bitcoin to participate in the dark web or to facilitate 




category of virtual currency litigation on the dark web involved vendors (U.S v. Colldock 2017; 
U.S v. Donagal 2014) or purchasers (U.S. v. Michell 2018; U.S. v. Reuer 2019) of illegal 
substances, such as Xanax powder, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and heroin. In these cases, 
defendants in cryptocurrency litigation involving the dark web were motivated by personal 
and/or corporate gains. Thousands of vendors, for example, used the dark web Silk Road to sell 
$183 million worth of illegal drugs, goods, and services. Ulbricht, the owner and operator of Silk 
Road who operated under the username Dread Pirate Roberts (“DPR”), earned millions of dollars 
in commissions profits (based on a portion of sellers’ revenues) from transactions conducted on 
Silk Road (U.S. v. Ulbricht 2014, 2017). Vallerius, a Paris-based defendant, also acted as 
operator, administrator, moderator, and vendor of the dark web Dream Market under the 
username “OxyMonster” (U.S v. Vallerius 2018:*1). He received millions of dollars through the 
use of a bitcoin tip jar or electronic depository. Table 6 summarizes the economic, 
organizational, and behavior dimension of convenience theory as applied to cryptocurrency 
litigation involving the dark web.  
_____________________________ 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
_____________________________ 
Opportunities: anonymity of transactions and layers of security in the dark web 
  Defendants in cryptocurrency litigation availed themselves of characteristics of the dark 
web and exploited situational opportunities that allowed them to commit financial crime. The 
anonymity of transactions on the dark web gave defendants a sense of security that transactions 
would not be traceable to them by law enforcement authorities. The dark web’s guaranty of 
anonymity is facilitated by: (1) the use of the Tor network that anonymizes internet traffic and 




anonymous transactions not traceable to specific accounts and users; and (3) the ability to create 
multiple false accounts without means of identification. 
Two related cases illustrate how the intrinsic nature of the dark web facilitates the 
perpetration of financial crime. Ulbricht, owner and operator of Silk Road under the alias of 
Dread Pirate Roberts (“DPR”), designed Silk Road as an online criminal marketplace (U.S. v. 
Ulbricht 2014, 2017). The Tor software of Silk Road enabled users to access the Internet 
anonymously by obscuring users’ unique identifying Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses, which 
prevented surveillance or tracking by law enforcement authorities. All purchases conducted on 
Silk Road used bitcoins, an anonymous online currency (U.S. v. Ulbricht 2017). Between 2011 
to 2013, Ulbricht through Silk Road enabled users located “anywhere in the world with an 
internet connection” to anonymously buy and sell illegal drugs and other illicit goods and 
services, including: (1) “heroin, cocaine, and lysergic acid diethylamide”; (2) malicious software 
designed for computer hacking, such as “password stealers, keyloggers, and remote access 
tools”; and (3) “murder-for-hire” schemes (U.S. v. Ulbricht 2014:549-550). In September 2013, 
after Ulbricht became a primary suspect in the DPR investigation, the government obtained five 
pen/trap orders under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (the “Pen/Trap Act”). The pen/trap orders did not 
permit access to the content of Ulbricht’s communications. Instead, the orders authorized law 
enforcement agents to “collect IP address data for Internet traffic to and from Ulbricht’s home 
wireless router and other devices that regularly connected to Ulbricht’s home router” (U.S. v. 
Ulbricht 2017:83). Ulbricht was arrested in a San Francisco public library on October 1, 2013. 
On the day of Ulbricht’s arrest, the government obtained a warrant to seize Ulbricht’s laptop and 





  Another characteristic of dark web operations is the ability to reach global markets at a 
rapid pace (Holt, Burruss, and Bossler 2018). Since the dark web is accessible online by anyone 
with a reliable computer and an internet connection, its potential reach is only limited by the 
confines of the internet. The dark web is also capable of operating initially without detection by 
law enforcement authorities or government regulators. This lack of regulation and visibility at 
the outset enables it to operate under the radar of government authorities—at least until it reaches 
a critical mass in terms of transactions and currency before government regulators become aware 
of its operations. 
Conclusion 
  Analysis of federal case law reveal patterns and methods of perpetrating illegal 
cryptocurrency activities, including operating unlicensed money transmitting and money service 
businesses, commodity fraud, securities fraud, bitcoin scams, including bitcoin exchange fraud 
and corporate takeover of a credit union to perpetuate illegal bitcoin transactions. Other 
cryptocurrency crime was administered on the dark web, which involved selling and purchasing 
illegal goods and services. Analysis of U.S. federal district and circuit court case law involving 
cryptocurrency crimes and fraud indicate support for the convenience theory of white-collar 
crime. Defendants in various schemes were motivated by financial gain, either for the company 
or for personal use. Their roles and positions in the businesses allowed them access to resources 
that helped them perpetrate fraud against clients, investors, and stockholders, including availing 
of the following opportunities and favorable circumstances: (1) operation of front companies in 
cases involving unlicensed money transmitting and money service businesses dealing with 
bitcoins and other virtual currencies; (2) relationship building by defendants and neutralization of 




from purchases of virtual currencies, representing that tokens were safe and reliable investments 
when they were risky, and overestimating abilities and capacities to provide services promised to 
investors in securities fraud; (4) breaching fiduciary duties to their clients and corporate 
stockholders in bitcoin scams by misappropriating profits and service fees to which they were 
not entitled or using the company for their own personal profits instead of for the stockholders’ 
and investors’ benefits; and (5) engaging in dark web  transactions by administrators, vendors, 
and purchasers that were guaranteed anonymity and through an online venue that had far 
reaching and rapid global access and was not actively regulated by law enforcement or 
government authorities. Defendants employed various neutralization techniques to justify their 
crimes, which included allegations of legal mistake and the legality of their actions.  Defendants 
also denied injury or harm, denied responsibility, condemned the condemners, appealed to higher 
loyalties, and presented dilemma trade-offs by weighing various concerns that resulted in the 
illegal act, including normality of action.    
  This article contributes to existing literature in the nascent field of cryptocurrency crime 
by providing a comprehensive analysis based on federal case law of how various types of 
cryptocurrency crimes are perpetrated. The article also develops common themes underlying 
each type of cryptocurrency crime activities, and the reasoning and modus operandi of federal 
court defendants. The article also uses convenience theory to more fully understand 
cryptocurrency crimes and fraudulent schemes. Reliance on case law serves as a proxy for 
interviewing persons involved in cryptocurrency crimes. Future research should empirically 
examine cryptocurrency crimes to determine the factors that predict either engaging in 
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